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1 Introduction
Imagine you are just setting up a transportation company. Your first task is to hire
drivers and to buy trucks. At this point, you realize that you have to choose not only
how many, but also what type of trucks to buy: in the market there are large ones,
small ones, fast and slow ones, more and less fuel-consuming ones. What bothers you
is that you will have to try to optimize over all these things simultaneously. Now,
assume that you have succeeded, and let us go fast forward to when your company
is already well-established. It turns out that in the meantime, your company has
accumulated some extra capital but did not hire new drivers. It is now relatively
capital-abundant. In such case, you should use mostly large, heavy trucks: only
these can assure a high enough marginal product of labor. What if it was relatively
labor-abundant? Then you should clearly decide to use trucks that are small but
fast: you would care more about the marginal product of capital then. Now, fast
forward again. Imagine that there has been a technological breakthrough in the
truck industry: the new trucks are larger, faster, and less fuel-consuming than the
old ones. Clearly, marginal products of capital and labor have both increased. But
which one has increased by more? And how will you adjust your demand for capital
and labor in response to such a change? You start feeling a bit confused...
We have to cut this story here, because this paper is not going to be about trucks
and drivers. It is going to be about endogenous technology choice by firms and about
the implied direction of technical change, but in the economy as a whole.
This paper accepts Jones’ (2005) view that the production function, commonly
assumed by macroeconomists to be a primitive, is in fact only a reduced form which
should be derived from microfoundations. It is also acknowledged that such economy-
wide production function has to be viewed as an assembly of a multiplicity of pro-
duction techniques, particular methods of producing the final good.
Generalizing the Jones’ setup, we derive from idea-based microfoundations a new
class of production functions, baptized herein “Clayton-Pareto” functions. It is indeed
a large class: it nests both the Cobb-Douglas function and the CES.1 Unfortunately,
we are unable to provide closed-form formulae for all Clayton-Pareto functions. We
carry out a detailed study of solvable special cases instead.
We take Jones’ results as a benchmark, and show that by the means of a slight
modification of his assumptions, the “Cobb-Douglas global production function and
purely labor-augmenting technical change” result can be overturned.
To our knowledge, both the derivation of a class of production functions that nests
the Cobb-Douglas and the CES, and the provision of an idea-based microfoundation
1The parameters of our microfounded global production function are interrelated. In consequence,
it makes sense to indicate that “the Clayton-Pareto family nests both the Cobb-Douglas and the
CES”: saying that it nests the CES only (which itself nests the Cobb-Douglas) would not reflect
the result properly. At the intersection of conditions guaranteeing the CES, and the Cobb-Douglas
result, we would obtain a Cobb-Douglas function with exponents (.5, .5) only.
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for the CES production function, are novel to the literature.
We also build a formal link between Jones (2005), and Caselli and Coleman (forth-
coming). We find an idea-based explanation for (a generalization of) the shape of the
technology frontier Caselli and Coleman postulate, and thus in a sense, we bring their
model to a common denominator with Jones’. In this respect, we acknowledge that
Caselli and Coleman interpret their model differently than Jones does. Namely, in
place of firms, they put countries; in place of the local production function, they put
country ’s production function; in place of the global production function, they put
world production function. In the outcome, they obtain the world technology frontier
and not just a technology frontier faced by a representative firm, as Jones does.2 The
models of Jones, and Caselli and Coleman have been empirically justified on diverse
bases, but they are characterized by profound mathematical unity, which we would
like to uncover.
As a by-product of our analytic method, we also enrich the literature by provid-
ing alternative proofs for Jones’ results, and finding explicit solutions for the firms’
technology choices wherever it is possible.
To discuss the long-run implications of the new class of production functions, we
embed our framework in the standard neoclassical (Solow, 1956) growth model. We
find that Jones’ (and Acemoglu’s, 2003) results of technical change being purely labor-
augmenting in the long run do not hold in general, but do hold in certain important
cases, among which independence of the capital- and labor-augmenting developments
is probably the most prominent. In general, technical change tends to augment both
capital and labor, even in the long run. One simple intuition for this result is that
if productivities of production factors are correlated, then it is impossible to achieve
higher and higher productivity of labor without altering the productivity of capital
as well. We shall study this issue in greater detail in section 4.
We shall also discuss the possibility of endogenous growth that arises if the global
production function exhibits elasticity of substitution greater than one in the long
run.3
It is beyond all doubt that the problems discussed by this paper are important
for growth theory. Indeed, we try to find answers to such fundamental questions
as: “What is the true shape of the economy-wide production function?”, “What
direction of technical change should we expect in the long run?”, and “What drives
the elasticity of substitution between production factors?”. We manage to get new
insights, because we derive what most economists assume. We believe that if one
endows her model with solid microfoundations, she is also able to draw more refined
2The idea that countries with different factor endowments use different production technologies
has been studied earlier, among others, by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) as well as Basu and Weil
(1998).
3Such possibility has already been noticed in the seminal work of Solow (1956). There exists
substantial literature that deals with these issues, including de La Grandville (1989), Jones and
Manuelli (1990), Yuhn (1991), Klump and de La Grandville (2000), and Palivos and Karagiannis
(2004).
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macro-scale conclusions; on the other hand, she may also encounter new unexpected
puzzles along the way. In any case, new knowledge is attained.4
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we gener-
alize Jones’ setup by allowing for dependence between capital- and labor-augmenting
developments, and we derive the class of Clayton-Pareto functions. In section 3, we
discuss the solvable special cases and describe the determinants of the elasticity of
substitution. In section 4, we determine the long-run direction of technical change
and check the conditions for endogenous growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 The shape of production functions
We shall now lay out the basic framework of our analysis. Most of its features come
from the original Jones’ (2005) framework. The concept of a technology frontier has
been taken from Caselli and Coleman (forthcoming).
We consider a representative firm. Each individual production technique that this
firm can use, named a local production function (LPF) hereafter, should be intuitively
associated with a “recipe”, or a list of instructions to follow. In order to produce,
the firm has to pick a single LPF from the range of available ones, and follow it.
Thanks to this interpretation, the LPFs should be fairly rigid and not allow for much
substitutability between factors of production.5
The second important assumption is that factors can be utilized, according to a
given LPF, with certain efficiency levels only. In this paper, we are going to identify
the notion of an idea with these efficiency levels. Since we are going to consider
only two factors of production here: capital K and labor L, an idea is consequently
going to be a pair (a, b), where b and a are unit productivities of capital and labor,
respectively.6 Technical change is then identified with the sequential arrival of new,
better and better, ideas. The global production function (GPF) is the convex hull
of LPFs, or to put it in different words, it is such an assembly of LPFs, that for
each K and L, productivities b and a are chosen optimally by the firm whose choice
is constrained within the set of available ideas. The technology frontier is a subset
of this set that contains only the ideas which could possibly be used by the profit-
maximizing firm.
4Earlier literature that deals with closely related issues includes Houthakker (1955-56), Uzawa
(1961), Kortum (1997) and Acemoglu (2003). Moreover, endogenous technology choice has common
features with the assignment problem with heterogenous workers and tasks, analyzed by Sattinger
(1975); and vintage capital theory where technological improvements are embodied in consecutive
vintages of machines. This strand of literature dates back to Solow (1960), as well as Solow et al.
(1966).
5The extreme but most intuitive case would be the Leontief function (“fixed coefficients”), where
factors have to be used up in fixed proportions; more flexible functional forms are plausible as well,
as we shall see shortly.
6We reverse the order of a and b in order to stick to Jones’ (2005) notation where possible.
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Following Jones, we shall assume that each dimension of an idea, be it a or b, is
randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution.7
We would like to make it clear at this point that when a new idea arrives, it is
already a pair (a, b), chosen from some joint, bivariate distribution. The individ-
ual Pareto distributions of factor productivities serve only as marginal distributions
here: ideas are inherently complex and multi-dimensional.8 This fact is a source of
a huge ambiguity, however: we do not have any empirical evidence on the pattern of
dependence between the marginal idea distributions.
To resolve this ambiguity, Jones arbitrarily assumes independence (p. 528):
Assumption 1. The parameters describing an idea are drawn from in-
dependent Pareto distributions: (...)
but does not offer any motivation for this assumption.
In this paper, this assumption is waived. Jones’ setup is generalized by allowing
for dependence.
We remain agnostic as to what should be the appropriate measure of dependence
between the marginal idea distributions. Nevertheless, we pick the Clayton family of
copulas9 to show that marginal Pareto distributions imply neither a Cobb-Douglas
global production function, nor purely labor-augmenting technical change in the long
run. On the contrary, they produce a wide variety of possibilities that we analyze in
detail.
2.1 The derivation procedure
Our derivation procedure of the GPF from the LPFs and the technology frontier can
be decomposed into three steps.
1. The first step consists in deriving the technology frontier from the joint distri-
bution of ideas. This is done in proposition 2.
2. The second step is to find the optimal factor efficiency levels a∗ and b∗ (i.e. to
pick the optimal LPF), given the available technology level N and the associated
technology frontier, as well as stocks of capital K and labor L. This task is
accomplished in proposition 3.
7Empirical evidence for prevalence of Pareto distributions in scientific productivity dates back to
Lotka (1926). Theoretical literature linking Pareto distributions of ideas to exponential steady-state
growth includes Kortum (1997) and Gabaix (1999).
8See Olsson (2005) for a very interesting elaboration of this claim.
9See Nelsen (1999) for an introduction to the copula theory. We indicate that there exist
many families of copulas, different to the one we have chosen. The Clayton family belongs to
the Archimedean class, as i.e. the Frank and the Gumbel family do; another widely recognized class
of copulas is the elliptic class (Nelsen, 1999).
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3. The third step (and the last one) consists in building a convex hull of LPFs –
i.e. in inserting the optimal pair of technologies (a∗, b∗) to the LPF, separately
for each pair of endowments (K,L). Convex hull of the LPFs is the GPF, as
stated in proposition 4.
2.2 The technology frontier
We proceed directly to the first step of our derivation procedure.10 We assume that
research activity brings about discoveries of new ideas, whose levels are stochastic
and drawn from Pareto distributions:
Assumption 1 Unit factor productivities a˜ and b˜ are Pareto-distributed:
P (a˜ > a) =
(
γa
a
)α
, a ≥ γa > 0, α > 0, (1)
P (b˜ > b) =
(
γb
b
)β
, b ≥ γb > 0, β > 0. (2)
As opposed to Jones (2005), who assumes that a˜ and b˜ are independent, we allow
them to be mutually dependent. We shall produce a multiplicity of joint (bivariate)
ideas distributions, keeping (1) and (2) as marginal distributions, using the Clayton
family of copulas:
Assumption 2 Dependence between the unit factor productivities a˜ and b˜ is repre-
sented by the Clayton copula, specified in (3).
Let us now elaborate this assumption. In fact, all the members of the Clayton
family of copulas are characterized by the following formula (Nelsen, 1999):
C(u, v) = max
{
0, (u−δ + v−δ − 1)−1/δ} , (3)
where u and v are random variables, uniformly distributed over the unit interval,
and δ ≥ −1 captures the degree and sign of dependence between the marginal idea
distributions. δ = 0 denotes independence, and thus calls for a replacement of (3)
with C(u, v) = uv. We consider δ to be the crucial parameter here, because it is
exactly the Jones’ (2005) assumption of δ = 0 that we relax, and whose relaxation
yields so interesting results.
In the next step, we shall replace u and v with suitable cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs). For the ease of exposition, we shall not do it in the main text,
but relegate this point to Appendix A.1, which contains the proof of the following
proposition:
10We consider the following subsection vital for the conveyed point, nevertheless a reader who is
unfamiliar with, or sceptical about the probabilistic setting may want to take Proposition 2 as an
assumption and proceed directly to subsection 2.3.
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Proposition 1 Distribution of the two-dimensional random variable (a˜, b˜) is given
by
P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = max
{
0,
((
γa
a
)−αδ
+
(
γb
b
)−βδ
− 1
)− 1
δ
}
, (4)
if δ ∈ [−1,+∞)\{0}; or
P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) =
(
γa
a
)α(
γb
b
)β
, (5)
if δ = 0 (the marginal distributions are independent).
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The Clayton copula parameter δ measures the degree and sign of dependence
between individual factor productivities: if δ < 0, they are negatively correlated; if
δ > 0, they are positively correlated. The probability (4) stands a chance of being
zero only if δ < 0.
We note that imposing δ = 0, which stands for independence, leads to (5), which
is equation (20) of Jones’ paper.
We shall now define formally one of the most important concepts of the paper:
the technology frontier. Application of this definition will make the correspondence
between the stochastic arrival of ideas and the deterministic GPF clearer.
Definition 1 The technology frontier is a curve in the (a, b) space, such that the
probability P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) is constant along this curve.
This seemingly simple definition helps us move away from tedious probabilistic con-
siderations back to the deterministic world. It is consistent with the approach of
Caselli and Coleman (forthcoming), and section II of the Jones’ article. However,
its motivation turns out to be not so simple after all. In quest of such, we build a
model of research, where each invention needs to be understood and connected with
the existing stock of knowledge by a given percentage of researchers before it comes
into industrial use. An outline of this model has been relegated to Appendix B, so
that the main line of reasoning within this section is not obstructed by a digression.
Using definition 1, together with equations (4) and (5), we can write the formula
for the technology frontier now. It is contained in the following
Proposition 2 Assume δ ∈ [−1,+∞)\{0}. Then, the technology frontier H(a, b) is
given by
H(a, b) = γaαδ + bβδ = N, (6)
where γ and N are positive constants. They are functions of model parameters, defined
by γ ≡ γ
βδ
b
γαδa
, and N ≡ γβδb [P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b)−δ + 1]. See that N ∈ [γβδb , 2γβδb ] if δ < 0,
and N ≥ 2γβδb if δ > 0.
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If δ = 0, then the technology frontier becomes
H(a, b) = aαbβ = N, (7)
where N ≡ γαa γ
β
b
P (a˜>a,b˜>b)
≥ γαa γβb .
Proof. It is easy and requires only algebraic manipulations. 
Figure 1: Examples of technology frontiers. Assumed parameter val-
ues: α = 5, β = 2.5, γa = 1, γb = .2;N ∈ {.5, 2, 10} (increasing from bottom to
top) for δ ∈ {0, .5, 1}, and N ∈ {9, 10, 11} (increasing from top to bottom)
for δ = −.5.
We note that equation (7) above is Jones’ equation (8).
Please note the following consequence of proposition 2: if there is negative depen-
dence between individual factor productivities (δ < 0), then perspectives for tech-
nological progress are limited: N is bounded. Thus, negative dependence between
marginal idea distributions implies a strong “fishing-out” effect: with N = γβδb , the
probability P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) becomes zero, and further progress is impossible. In-
tuitively, because of the negative dependence, all further labor-(capital-)augmenting
8
innovations would have to be unambiguously capital-(labor-)impairing. Such per-
spectives are clearly not desirable for a researcher.
On the other hand, if there is positive dependence between individual factor pro-
ductivities (δ > 0), then R&D can well go on forever. We will need these results for
our considerations on the long-run direction of technical change in section 4.
A number of illustrative examples of technology frontiers, given by proposition 2,
can be found in figure 1.
In the following analysis, we shall also assume that αδ > θ and βδ > θ, so that the
curvature of the LPF is always greater than the curvature of the technology frontier.
This would guarantee an interior solution to the optimization problems, which will
ensue in section 2.3. These two inequality constraints have been derived from the
second-order conditions in Appendix A.3.
2.3 Endogenous technology choice
Let us now proceed to the second step of our derivation procedure.
We shall make an important assumption that assures analytical tractability of our
model. Namely, we assume the local production functions to be CES:
Assumption 3 The local production function (LPF) Y˜ is given by
Y˜ (K,L; a, b) = A˜
(
ψ(bK)θ + (1− ψ)(aL)θ
) 1
θ
, (8)
where A˜ > 0, θ ∈ (−∞, 1]\{0} and ψ ∈ (0, 1), or
Y˜ (K,L; a, b) = A˜(bK)ψ(aL)1−ψ, (9)
where A˜ > 0 and ψ ∈ (0, 1), if θ = 0.
We take this assumption from Caselli and Coleman (forthcoming). At this point,
we do not have to impose θ < 0 on top of it, as they do. Doing so would be natural
for anyone who wants to stick to the “recipe” interpretation of the LPF, but we shall
be more flexible here.11
The second step of our derivation procedure can be written as a competitive firm’s
optimization problem. Such firm faces a continuum of LPFs (production techniques)
given by (8) or (9), and indexed by a and b along the available technology frontier.
11Assuming θ < 0 is equivalent to saying that the elasticity of substitution of the LPF, σ = 11−θ , lies
below unity. If we wanted to stick to the Jones’ “recipe” understanding of a LPF, it would indeed
seem reasonable to assume θ ≈ −∞, so that each production technique (LPF) is approximately
Leontief. See Jones (2005, p. 517-8) for an intuitive clarification of his understanding of a LPF. On
the other hand, if the LPF denotes a country’s production function (so the GPF denotes the world
production function), then we would expect rather θ ≈ 0 than θ ≈ −∞.
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The firm chooses one of them in order to maximize its profit. It also optimally chooses
its demand for capital and labor.
The problem of the competitive firm can be decomposed into two separate phases:
first, choosing the optimal technology (a, b) for given endowmentsK,L and prices r, w;
and then choosing the demand for both factors of production, taking their prices as
given. Because we are only interested in finding the shape of the “Clayton-Pareto”
global production function, and not in the general equilibrium of the economy, we
shall skip the second phase.12
The first phase of the competitive firm’s optimization problem in the typical case
δ 6= 0, θ 6= 0 can be written as
max
a,b
{
A˜
(
ψ(bK)θ + (1− ψ)(aL)θ) 1θ − rK − wL} s.t. γaαδ + bβδ = N. (10)
First-order conditions imply that:13
bβδ−θ
aαδ−θ
=
γψ
1− ψ
α
β
kθ, (11)
where we denoted k ≡ K/L for convenience. Solving this equation for b yields
b = ck
θ
βδ−θ a
αδ−θ
βδ−θ , (12)
which, plugged into (6), gives
Φ(a, k;N) = γaαδ + cβδk
θβδ
βδ−θ a
βδ(αδ−θ)
βδ−θ −N = 0, (13)
where c ≡
(
γψ
1−ψ
α
β
) 1
βδ−θ
.
Before we go further with the calculations, we shall consider the following quali-
tative
Proposition 3 Let αδ > θ and βδ > θ. Then, the optimization problem (10) allows
a unique positive solution (a∗(k;N), b∗(k;N)).
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
Equation (13) suffices to infer existence and uniqueness of the solution; unfortu-
nately, it contains a sum of two arbitrary powers of a and thus, unless some particular
equality constraint holds, (δ = 0, θ = 0 and α = β are the most interesting),14 no
12Caselli and Coleman (forthcoming) close the model by assuming that the produced good is the
numeraire and in the whole economy, stocks of available capital K and labor L are fixed. Jones
(2005) skips the second phase.
13Exact derivations have been relegated to the appendix A.3.
14Another possibility is that one of the exponents equals 2, 3, or 4 times the other. An example
of an analytically tractable Clayton-Pareto production function that is neither Cobb-Douglas nor
CES, is included in subsection 3.5.
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explicit formula for a as a function of capital per worker k and technology level N
can be obtained from it.
Comparing our results to Jones’, we can already hear the first alarm bell going off.
Namely, optimal technology levels a∗ and b∗ depend on θ, the curvature parameter of
the LPF. Hence, Jones’ (2005, p. 528) claim, that
[o]f course, the intuition regarding the global production function suggests
that it is determined by the distribution of ideas, not by the shape of the
local production function
does not hold in general. Equation (13) clearly suggests that in the typical “Clayton-
Pareto” case, shape of the LPF matters for the shape of the GPF.
2.4 The global production function
We shall now pass to the third step of our procedure. We shall find the convex hull
of LPFs, with a∗ ≡ a∗(k;N) and b∗ ≡ b∗(k;N) defined as above.
The most straightforward (and underestimated) way to do it is to insert a∗ and
b∗ directly into the LPF formula (8). Another one is to characterize it alternatively
in terms of partial elasticities, following Jones, Eq. (7):
εK
1− εK =
ηb
ηa
, (14)
where εK =
∂Y
∂K
K
Y
is the partial elasticity of the global production function Y with
respect to K; and ηa, ηb are partial elasticities of the technology frontier H with
respect to a and b, respectively. Deriving equation (14) requires usage of the Envelope
Theorem and the degree-one homogeneity of the GPF.
We shall point out that although both methods give the same results for the
shape of the global production function, they are not equivalent. The first method is
probably computationally more demanding, but it does not incur a loss of information
due to differentiation, as the second one does. Thus, only thanks to the first method,
all parameters of the global production function, including its intercept term, can be
recovered.
Summing up, we obtain the following characterization of a GPF, which belongs
to the Clayton-Pareto family:
Proposition 4 Given assumptions 1, 2 and 3, propositions 1 and 2, and the firms’
optimizing behavior summarized in (10), the GPF is given by
Y (K,L;N) ≡ A˜
(
ψ(b∗K)θ + (1− ψ)(a∗L)θ
) 1
θ
, (15)
where a∗ and b∗ satisfy (11), (12) and (13). This implies that
εK
1− εK =
ψ
1− ψ
(
b∗K
a∗L
)θ
=
β
γα
(b∗)βδ
(a∗)αδ
. (16)
11
Proof. Already given in text. 
Proposition 4 implicitly defines all GPFs that belong to the Clayton-Pareto class.
A few of them have been depicted in figure 2.
Figure 2: Left panel: a representative Clayton-Pareto production
function compared to the Cobb-Douglas and the CES. Right panel: im-
pact of the degree of dependence δ on the resultant Clayton-Pareto
production functions. Assumed parameter values (unless indicated
otherwise): A˜ = 1, γa = 1, γb = .2, θ = −1, α = 5, β = 2.5, ψ = .5, δ = .5,
P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = .1. For the CES case, we equalized α = β = 5; for the
Cobb-Douglas case, δ = 0.
Let us now indicate the following property of Clayton-Pareto functions. Namely,
not all of them are really production functions: some of them are not concave and
thus violate the diminishing marginal utility requirement. Such situation is most
likely to emerge if αδ ≈ θ, i.e. the second-order conditions are satisfied, but with a
very narrow margin. In figure 2, we present such case for δ = −.09. See also that for
δ = −.01, the Clayton-Pareto function is concave, albeit its implied marginal product
of capital decreases very slowly. As we shall see in the next section, the concavity
condition can be put in a simple analytical form given a very particular parameter
choice. In general, however, this condition is given by a large and unintuitive formula.
3 Special cases
The drawback of our characterization of the Clayton-Pareto class of production func-
tions is that we did not obtain a closed form. To make up for this obvious deficiency,
we shall now dwell more on the solvable special cases. They all have meaningful
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economic interpretations. We find that the Clayton-Pareto family nests the Cobb-
Douglas function and the CES function.
3.1 Independent Pareto distributions
Independence of the marginal idea distributions, i.e. δ = 0, yields a particularly
nice and interpretable result – the benchmark result due to Jones (2005). It is a
link between independent Pareto idea distributions and Cobb-Douglas production
functions.
With δ = 0, the technology frontier is given by equation (5), which implies that
the firm’s optimality condition equivalent to (13) can be solved explicitly as{
a∗(k;N) = N
1
α+β c˜
β
α+β k
β
α+β
b∗(k;N) = N
1
α+β c˜−
α
α+β k−
α
α+β ,
(17)
where c˜ =
(
α
β
ψ
1−ψ
)1/θ
and θ < 0. As Jones finds out, the GPF comes to satisfy:
εK
1− εK =
β
α
, (18)
so it needs to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, and exponents pro-
portional to α and β, i.e. it needs to be
Y (K,L;N) = A(N)K
β
α+βL
α
α+β . (19)
Further calculations yield that the factor-neutral productivity term A(N) is given by
A(N) = A˜N
1
α+β
[
ψ
β
α+β (1− ψ) αα+β
((α
β
)− α
α+β
+
(α
β
) β
α+β
)] 1
θ
.
Moreover, if we take θ → −∞, so that the LPFs are approximately Leontief, then
we obtain A(N)→ A˜N 1α+β . This precisely corresponds to Jones’ equation (28).
In this particular case of independent Pareto distributions, we could have missed
the second step (finding a∗ and b∗), and yet we would have arrived at almost the same
result (the only difference is that now we would have failed to compute A(N)). This
is because in (18), the GPF is required to exhibit constant partial elasticities with
respect to its arguments, which is a defining property of Cobb-Douglas functions. So
here, shapes of the LPFs have no impact on the shape of the GPF.15
15We have to maintain the assumption, that local production functions exhibit constant returns
to scale, though. Moreover, to remain in the interior solution, we still have to assume that the
elasticity of substitution of the LPFs is everywhere lower than unity. Finally, shapes of the LPFs –
described by the parameters θ and ψ – do have an impact on A(N).
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3.2 Cobb-Douglas local production functions
It turns out that the “conjugate” of the Jones’ “no-impact” assertion holds as well: if
local production functions are Cobb-Douglas (i.e. θ = 0), then the global production
function is Cobb-Douglas, irrespective of the shape of the technology frontier.16 This
is fairly confusing a result, taking into account the Jones’ assertion, which we cited
in section 2.3.
Namely, once we assume that the LPFs are given by (9), we obtain that the shape
of the technology frontier takes no part in determining the shape of the GPF. To see
this implication, note that in the last step of our procedure, we would obtain
εK
1− εK =
ψ
1− ψ, (20)
implying a GPF of a Cobb-Douglas form:
Y (K,L;N) = A(N)KψL1−ψ, (21)
irrespective of the shape of the technology frontier, provided that the two marginal
distributions of unit productivities are positively dependent, which is necessary for
an interior solution.
Further calculations yield A(N) = A˜c¯
ψ
βδ
(
N
γ+c¯
) ψ
βδ
+ 1−ψ
αδ
, where c¯ = γψ
1−ψ
α
β
. This
means that technology choice is irrelevant for the shape of GPF, but it is not irrelevant
for the level of A(N). To facilitate comparisons, we shall point out here, that in the
optimum, firms choose technologies a∗ and b∗ according to:a
∗(k;N) =
(
N
γ+c¯
) 1
αδ
,
b∗(k;N) =
(
Nc¯
γ+c¯
) 1
βδ
.
(22)
Note that in this case, technology choice is independent of the endowments in capital
K and labor L.
3.3 CES production function
Let us now assume that the shape parameters of both Pareto idea distributions are
equal, i.e. α = β. We shall see shortly, that in this particular knife-edge case, an
explicit formula for the GPF can also be obtained. Moreover, this function exhibits
a constant elasticity of substitution.
16Cobb-Douglas LPFs are not plausible, if one maintains a “recipe” understanding of a LPF,
because they are characterized by unitary elasticity of substitution between factors. On the other
hand, for the Caselli and Coleman’s understanding of a LPF as a country-wide production function,
they are perfectly plausible.
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With α = β, the technology frontier (6) becomes:
H(a, b) = γaαδ + bαδ = N, (23)
which is apparently Caselli and Coleman’s equation (5). In their paper, it has been
assumed without any explicit justification; therefore, by writing this equation down
as a special case of our model, we can claim that we provide some “Clayton-Pareto”
microfoundation for it.
Namely, instead of admitting that
[t]he particular functional form of equation (5) is dictated by technical
convenience, but it is rather flexible, (...)
(Caselli and Coleman, forthcoming, p. 16 of the Working Paper version), we view the
equation as microfounded using Pareto distributions and the Clayton copula. On the
other hand, within our framework, its flexibility is questionable since it hinges upon
the knife-edge assumption α = β.
The first order condition (11) of the representative firm’s optimization problem
(10) can be now solved as:
a∗(k;N) =
(
N
γ+cαδk
αδθ
αδ−θ
) 1
αδ
,
b∗(k;N) =
(
Ncαδk
αδθ
αδ−θ
γ+cαδk
αδθ
αδ−θ
) 1
αδ
.
(24)
Thus, the GPF satisfies the equation:
εK
1− εK =
cαδk
αδθ
αδ−θ
γ
, (25)
so it takes the CES form (see Arrow et al., 1961):17
Y (K,L;N) = A(N)(ζKξ + (1− ζ)Lξ)1/ξ, (26)
where
ξ =
αδθ
αδ − θ , (27)
ζ =
cαδ
cαδ + γ
, (28)
A(N) = A˜N
1
αδ
(
(1− ψ) αδαδ−θ γ− θαδ−θ + ψ αδαδ−θ
)αδ−θ
αδθ
, (29)
17To prove this, note that εK(1−εK) =
K/L
MRS , whereMRS is the marginal rate of substitution between
capital and labor. Straightforward algebraic manipulations yield that the elasticity of substitution,
σ = ∂(K/L)∂MRS
MRS
K/L =
1
1−ξ , where ξ =
αδθ
αδ−θ . Now use the theorem due to Arrow et al. (1961) to get
(26). To obtain the coefficients A and ζ, more algebra is necessary. They have been computed by
equalizing Y˜ (K,L; a∗, b∗) = Y (K,L;N), and then gradually simplifying the resultant expression.
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and c =
(
γψ
1−ψ
) 1
αδ−θ
. The assumption αδ > θ guarantees an interior solution to the
competitive firm’s optimization problem.
Let us also note that if we take θ → −∞, so we assume that the LPFs are approx-
imately Leontief, then our result simplifies greatly: ξ → −αδ, A(N)→ A˜N 1αδ
(
1
γ+1
)
,
ζ → 1
γ+1
and c→ 1.
The CES result deserves a longer discussion. It follows in the next subsection.
3.4 Elasticity of substitution: a microfoundation
The exponent ξ of the CES function, derived in (27), implies that the elasticity of
substitution σ of the GPF is equal to
σ =
1
1− ξ =
αδ − θ
αδ − θ − αδθ . (30)
Assuming that the LPFs be approximately Leontief, i.e. θ → −∞, implies ξ →
−αδ and accordingly, σ → 1
1+αδ
.
One important remark is due here. To assign a serious economic interpretation to
the above formulae, i.e. to assure that the elasticity of substitution σ is positive so
that the marginal products of production factors are decreasing, we need to assume
αδ − θ − αδθ > 0.18
Having this assumption in mind, we see that the elasticity of substitution σ of
the global CES function and the degree of dependence between marginal Pareto dis-
tributions δ are inversely related (which is confirmed in figure 3). Moreover, we also
see that for the smallest possible values of δ, σ explodes to infinity, and for δ → ∞,
it approaches the (low) elasticity of substitution of the LPF:
lim
δ→
(
θ
α(1−θ)
)
+
αδ − θ
αδ − θ − αδθ = +∞ and limδ→+∞
αδ − θ
αδ − θ − αδθ =
1
1− θ . (31)
The inverse relation between δ and σ gets the most apparent, once θ is evaluated
at −∞. Indeed, in this case, the relation between δ and θ is linear, elasticity of
substitution σ exceeds unity if and only if δ < 0, and it approaches zero as δ → +∞.
Hence, we may conclude that what drives the elasticity of substitution of the GPF
is actually the difference between the curvature of the LPF, described by θ, and the
curvature of the technology frontier, described by αδ: the greater the difference, the
lower the elasticity of substitution of the GPF, or to put in other words, the closer is
σ to the (low) elasticity of substitution of the LPF.
18In the previous section, we indicated that not all Clayton-Pareto functions are concave. In the
particular CES case, it turns out that the resultant GPF is in fact convex (so that the marginal
product of capital is increasing) if αδ > θ but αδ − θ − αδθ < 0. We see that αδ − θ − αδθ > 0 is a
short closed-form concavity condition for the CES case, whose equivalent cannot be, unfortunately,
obtained for the general Clayton-Pareto case.
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Figure 3: Elasticity of substitution σ as a function of the degree of
dependence δ. Assumed parameter values: α = 5, θ = −1.
An intuitive argument in favor of this result goes as follows. The elasticity σ is
the percentage change in the demand for capital per worker, announced by the firms
which are assumed to maintain constant production, in response to a one per cent
increase in the marginal rate of substitution. In our setup, there exist two channels
of adjustment: first, through the demand for capital and labor, along a given LPF;
and second, through the choice of technologies a and b, along the technology frontier
and across LPFs. They both add to the total adjustment of the capital/labor ratio
along the GPF, and neither of these two channels of adjustment should be ignored.
To get a diagramatic representation of this reasoning, one should go back to figure
1, take one particular technology frontier, and add an isoquant of the LPF to it. This
isoquant should be tangent to the technology frontier and located to its north-east
(which is guaranteed by second-order optimality conditions). Now, the extreme cases
are the easiest to understand, and intermediate cases are also quite straightforward
once one understands the extreme ones. On the one extreme, if δ = +∞, then a and
b are fixed. Thus, all adjustment is necessarily made along the LPF, whose elasticity
of substitution is 1
1−θ . On the other extreme, if αδ− θ−αδθ = 0, then all adjustment
happens via a and b, so capital and labor are in fact perfect substitutes and the GPF
is linear (σ = +∞). All other cases are somewhere in between these extremes, so
that adjustment is made through both available channels.
Let us also point out that with α = β, the elasticity of substitution σ is a constant.
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It is fully determined by the deep parameters of the economy: the distribution of ideas
and the curvature of the LPFs. Thus, technical change and capital accumulation do
not influence its magnitude.19
The elasticity of substitution between capital (which is an accumulable factor),
and labor (which cannot be accumulated), has sizeable effects on the long-run per-
formance of an economy (see e.g. the two theorems by Klump and de La Grandville,
2000). In particular, σ > 1 may imply endogenous growth in absence of technical
progress and explosive growth when technical progress is present (see Jones, Manuelli,
1990 and Palivos, Karagiannis, 2004), as we shall see in the section 4.
3.5 A Clayton-Pareto example that is neither Cobb-Douglas
nor CES
As noted before, it is usually impossible to find a closed form for a∗(k;N), implicitly
defined by (13). There exist several exceptions to this rule, however, and one of them
is such that α
β
· βδ−θ
αδ−θ =
1
2
. In such case, (13) becomes quadratic. Solving it and
choosing the positive root yields the following optimal technology levels a∗ and b∗:
a∗(k;N) =
0
@−γ+
r
γ2+4Ncβδk
βδθ
βδ−θ
1
A
1
αδ
2
1
αδ c
β
α k
βθ
α(βδ−θ)
,
b∗(k;N) =
0
@−γ+
r
γ2+4Ncβδk
βδθ
βδ−θ
1
A
2
βδ
2
2
βδ ck
θ
βδ−θ
.
Plugging these technology choices into the LPFs yields the following Clayton-
Pareto production function:
y = f(k) = A˜
{
ψ
((
−γ +
√
γ2 + 4Ncβ δk
β δ θ
β δ−θ
) 2
β δ
2−
2
β δ c−1k
βδ−2θ
β δ−θ
)θ
+
+(1− ψ)
((
−γ +
√
γ2 + 4Ncβ δk
β δ θ
β δ−θ
) 1
α δ
2−
1
α δ c−
β
αk−
β θ
α (β δ−θ)
)θ} 1
θ
.
Having chosen a baseline parameter configuration, satisfying α
β
βδ−θ
αδ−θ =
1
2
, we
present the shape of this function in the left panel of figure 4.
The right panel of this figure confirms that this Clayton-Pareto function is char-
acterized by a variable elasticity of substitution. It belongs neither to the CES family
nor to the VES family (Revankar, 1971): its elasticity of substitution is a non-linear
function of capital per worker k.
19Of course, for non-CES Clayton-Pareto production functions (α 6= β), this property typically
does not hold.
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Figure 4: Example of a closed-form Clayton-Pareto production func-
tion. Assumed parameter values: A˜ = 1, γa = 1, γb = .2, θ = −1, α = 2, β =
5, ψ = .5, δ = .1, P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = .1. Left panel: the function. Right
panel: its elasticity of substitution.
We do not present here the analytical formula for the elasticity of substitution of
this Clayton-Pareto function, computed from
σ(k) =
f ′(k) (f(k)− kf ′(k))
−kf(k)f ′′(k) ,
because it is very large and thus completely uninformative.20 We hope that the reader
will find our graphical representation sufficient.
4 The direction of technical change
We shall now embed our microfounded model, developed in former sections, in the
standard neoclassical growth framework (Solow, 1956) to draw conclusions about the
long-run direction of technical change.
From now on, we shall assume exogenous technical progress in the form of a decline
in P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b): as time passes, more and more efficient technologies are invented.
With definition 1 in mind, it is clear that so defined an R&D activity is equivalent
to pushing the technology frontier further and further. The choice of an optimal
technology pair (a, b) from the technology frontier that is available at each instant of
time, is (as in the previous sections) left to firms. This means that we shall explicitly
20Matlab-generated LATEX code of this formula, typed with a 12-point Times font, is 11.5 A4-pages
long. For the curious reader, it is available from the author upon request.
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take advantage of the fact that in our framework, the direction of technical change is
endogenous.21
Capital evolves according to the usual equation of motion:
K˙ = sY − δKK, (32)
where δK > 0 is the capital depreciation rate, and s ∈ (0, 1) is the exogenous savings
rate. Labor force grows at a constant rate Lˆ ≡ L˙
L
= n ≥ 0. Equation (32) implies
that along the balanced growth path (BGP) – if there exists one, which is a very
stringent condition – the product/capital ratio stays constant.
We shall distinguish here between two different interpretations of technical change:
“crude” and “actually realized”. Crude technical change is the change in factor
productivities given factor endowments K and L, whereas actually realized technical
change takes into account also the evolution of factor endowments over time. We are
of course going to concentrate on actually realized technical change. A brief treatment
of crude technical change has been relegated to Appendix A.4.
In further derivations, we shall dwell on the three particular cases, δ = 0, θ = 0,
and α = β, that offer closed-form solutions only. They already give a taste of the vast
multiplicity of long-run outcomes of our model. In particular, the CES case turns
out to be the most revealing: it allows us to draw preliminary conclusions about the
dynamic properties of Clayton-Pareto production functions in general.
4.1 Independent Pareto distributions
We start with the case of independent Pareto distributions, studied by Jones (2005).
Having assumed Nˆ = g and y = Y/L, and used Yˆ = Kˆ, we find that the growth rate
of the economy along the BGP is given by
Yˆ =
g
α+ β
+
β
α+ β
Kˆ +
α
α+ β
Lˆ ⇒ yˆ = g
α
. (33)
From (17), we also have that aˆ = g
α+β
+ β
α+β
g
α
= g
α
and bˆ = g
α+β
− α
α+β
g
α
= 0. This
is exactly the Jones’ benchmark result of purely labor-augmenting technical change
in the long run. Despite the fact, that for each given K and L, technical progress is
factor-neutral in this case (see Appendix A.4), proportions of factors actually used in
production change along the BGP in such a way that the unit productivity of capital
– b – stays exactly constant.
4.2 Cobb-Douglas local production functions
We can now proceed to the case of Cobb-Douglas local production functions.
21Please note that our mechanism is different to the one present in Solow et al. (1966), or
alternatively, Acemoglu (2003).
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In such case, we still obtain existence of a BGP and a Cobb-Douglas GPF. How-
ever, we observe that technical change ceases to be purely labor-augmenting in the
long run. Namely, along the BGP,
Yˆ =
( ψ
βδ
+
1− ψ
αδ
)
g + ψKˆ + (1− ψ)Lˆ ⇒ yˆ =
( ψ
(1− ψ)βδ +
1
αδ
)
g. (34)
Now, the growth rate of the economy yˆ depends not only on α, as in equation
(33), but also on β (as well as ψ and δ). Redoing the same exercise as in the previous
subsection, we show that in this case, along the BGP, aˆ = g
αδ
> 0 and bˆ = g
βδ
> 0.
This means that technical change augments both factors of production in the long
run.
4.3 CES production function
The case of a CES global production function turns out to be more revealing than
the two Cobb-Douglas ones discussed just above, and it also gives a hint on what one
can expect in the general Clayton-Pareto case.
First of all, we note that in the CES case, a BGP (with a positive growth rate of
capital per worker) does not exist. This is the first difficulty we have to overcome.
To get some meaningful outcome concerning the long run, we have to dwell on the
asymptotics: by “in the long run” we will mean “as t →∞” rather than “along the
BGP”.
Second, we have to consider the two cases separately: ξ > 0 (σ > 1) where capital
and labor are gross substitutes; and ξ < 0 (σ < 1) where they are gross complements.
The gross-substitutes case (ξ > 0) emerges if 0 > αδ > θ or if αδ > θ > 0. Simple
calculations yield that in such case,
kˆ = sA(ζ + (1− ζ)k−ξ)1/ξ − δK − n ⇒ lim
k→∞
kˆ = sAζ1/ξ − δK − n. (35)
Hence, there is endogenous growth via capital accumulation if sAζ1/ξ − δK − n > 0.
Such endogenous growth is possible here thanks to the high elasticity of substitution
of the analyzed global production function.22 Since capital and labor are gross sub-
stitutes, marginal product of capital never declines to zero, and the Inada condition
in infinity does not hold.23
Note that equation (35) makes economic sense only if δ < 0 (so N is bounded)
or if we exogenously fix N (assume out all R&D activity). If A = A(N) were to
grow exogenously on top of the elasticity-driven endogenous growth, we would have
22The reasoning follows Palivos and Karagiannis (2004), and Jones and Manuelli (1990), in that
order.
23In the general Clayton-Pareto case, σ is not constant. However, one can clearly expect that en-
dogenous growth via capital accumulation shall appear if limk→∞ σ(k) > 1 (see Palivos, Karagiannis,
2004).
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arrived at an implausible explosive case of an economy that reaches infinite production
in finite time.
Moreover, in the gross-substitutes case ξ > 0, with δ > 0 and positive growth in
A(N), the condition for endogenous growth sAζ1/ξ − δK − n > 0 must (from some
time on) be satisfied. Thus, such economy is bound to explode to infinity in finite
time. For obvious reasons, we rule this case out.
Within the case of an endogenously, and yet non-explosively growing economy,
individual factor productivities approach certain limits as k → ∞ with time: b∗ →
N
1
αδ , and a∗ → 0 if δ > 0 or a∗ → +∞ if δ < 0.24 Hence, it is clearly a∗, the
productivity of labor (the unaccumulable factor) that drives the long-run endogenous
growth here: in the optimum, if δ > 0, so the unit productivities are positively
dependent, it collapses to zero; and if δ < 0, so the unit productivities are negatively
dependent, it explodes to infinity.
A completely different case to consider is the one where ξ < 0. If capital and
labor are gross complements, endogenous growth is impossible. On the other hand,
since ξ < 0 implies δ > 0 and θ < 0, exogenous growth driven by the R&D activity
(represented by perpetual growth in N) is both possible and plausible.
We find that in the gross-complements case there exists an asymptotic BGP – a
BGP that cannot be reached in finite time, but is gradually converged to as k →∞
with time. We have that
Yˆ =
g
αδ
+ εKKˆ + (1− εK)Lˆ ⇒ yˆ = g
αδ
+ εK kˆ. (36)
Let us now calculate the limit of yˆ as t→∞. Because of exogenous growth in N , we
have that A → ∞ and k → ∞. In consequence, the partial elasticity εK disappears
in the limit: εK = A
ξζ
(
k
y
)ξ
→ 0. This suffices to show that yˆ → g
αδ
. And by the
virtue of the capital’s equation of motion, we know that kˆ → g
αδ
as well.
As for the growth rates of unit factor productivities, we use (24) to show that
aˆ → g
αδ
and bˆ → g
αδ
+
(
θ
αδ−θ
)
g
αδ
= g
αδ−θ > 0. Hence, we see that in the CES case,
technical change augments both factors of production in the long run; not only labor,
as it was in the Jones’ case.25
There is a minor twist to this reasoning, however. As θ → −∞, so local production
functions become approximately Leontief, we get that bˆ→ 0. In the limit, where LPFs
are truly Leontief, technical change is purely labor-augmenting, even in the CES case.
We shall however insist that θ = −∞ is a very particular parameter choice: it is both
knife-edge (non-typical) and extreme.
In place of a written summary of this section, we present the time paths of unit
factor productivities effectively realized along the BGP (or asymptotic BGP, in the
24If δ < 0 and there is exogenous technical progress, then the furthest attainable technology
frontier is that with N = γαδb , and so b
∗ would in such case approach γb.
25And that is what one should expect in the typical Clayton-Pareto case, given that the long-run
elasticity of substitution is less than unity (i.e. if limk→∞ σ(k) < 1).
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Figure 5: The direction of technical change along a balanced growth
path. Unless stated otherwise, assumed parameter values are: g = .02,
α = 5, β = 2.5, θ = −1, δ = .5.
CES case) in figure 5. The starting point (a0, b0), and the long-run growth rate of the
economy g have been chosen arbitrarily. See that if the LPFs are not Leontief, then
technical change is purely labor-augmenting only in the Jones’ case of δ = 0.
In Appendix C, we employ the framework of this section to analyze the effects
of ongoing shifts in the parameters of the Pareto distributions of ideas. We show
that once they are allowed to change over time, our results concerning the long-run
direction of technical change may be again quite different.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have derived from microfoundations the “Clayton-Pareto” class of
production functions. We have discussed the properties of some of its most interesting
members. We have also analyzed the long-run implications of such production func-
tions for the direction of technical change, i.e. we checked when it is labor-augmenting,
capital-augmenting, or both.
Our “Clayton-Pareto” class of production functions has been obtained assuming
that each of the unit factor productivities is Pareto-distributed, that dependence
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between these marginal distributions is captured by the Clayton copula, and that
local production functions are CES. This class has been shown to nest both the
Cobb-Douglas functions and the CES. Contrary to Jones’ presumptions, its shape
typically depends on the shapes of local production functions.
Embedding our microfounded model in the neoclassical (Solow, 1956) growth
framework, we have proven that in general, technical progress tends to augment
both factors of production in the long run. We could find only two exceptions to this
rule, which would lead to purely labor-augmenting technical change: the case of inde-
pendent marginal distributions, which implies a Cobb-Douglas GPF; and the case of
Leontief local production functions, while the GPF is either CES or Cobb-Douglas.
We have also proven that in some cases, the neoclassical growth model with
Clayton-Pareto production exhibits endogenous growth via capital accumulation.
Moreover, assuming exogenous technological progress on top of it leads to explosivity.
Summing up: the goals that we achieved in this paper have been to critically
re-examine the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions and purely labor-
augmenting technical change, ubiquitous in contemporary growth theory; and to show
that even a slight departure from the original Jones’ (2005) framework can lead to
novel results.
This article can be extended in several ways. First, our setup can be generalized
to include further factors of production, such as human capital or non-renewable and
renewable resources. Second, alternative copulas may be used to capture dependence
between the marginal idea distributions. We doubt that the resultant production
functions will follow widely recognized shapes, like e.g. the CES, but an analysis of,
say, Frank-Pareto, or Gumbel-Pareto production functions, could certainly add new
interesting insights to this strand of literature. Third, one may also wish to ana-
lyze the behavior of our microfounded model under R&D-based endogenous growth.
Fourth, one may want to relax the assumption that the LPFs be CES. And last but
not least, empirical studies in this field would be of enormous value.
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A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Recall that the marginal idea distributions of a˜ and b˜ are Pareto, given by (1) and
(2), respectively.
Because the Pareto distribution is nicely defined in terms of its survival func-
tion and not the cumulative distribution function (CDF) itself, we find it useful to
substitute X = −a˜, Y = −b˜.26
CDFs of X and Y satisfy:
P (a˜ > a) = P (X < −a) ≡ FX(−a) =
(
γa
a
)α
,
P (b˜ > b) = P (Y < −b) ≡ FY (−b) =
(
γb
b
)β
,
where a ≥ γa > 0 and b ≥ γb > 0. Applying the Clayton copula formula given in (3)
to the CDFs of X and Y yields:
F (a, b) = C(FX(a), FY (b)) = max
{
0,
((
γa
−a
)−αδ
+
(
γb
−b
)−βδ
− 1
)− 1
δ
}
,
where a ≤ −γa < 0 and b ≤ −γb < 0.
Finally, we apply P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = F (−a,−b) to get (4).
If δ = 0, then
P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = FX(−a)FY (−b) =
(
γa
a
)α(
γb
b
)β
,
which is directly (5). 
A.2 Proof of proposition 3
We apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the Φ function, defined in (13). First of
all, we notice that Φ ∈ C1(R3+). Second, we observe that
∂Φ
∂a
= γαδaαδ−1 +
(βδ(αδ − θ)
βδ − θ
)
cβδk
θβδ
βδ−θ a
βδ(αδ−θ)
βδ−θ −1, (37)
and so, using αδ − θ > 0 and βδ − θ > 0, we obtain ∂Φ
∂a
> 0 if and only if δ > 0, and
∂Φ
∂a
< 0 if and only if δ < 0. Hence (since δ 6= 0),27 clearly ∂Φ
∂a
6= 0 for all k > 0 and
26Instead of inverting the random variables, we could also rotate the Clayton copula.
27The δ = 0 (independence) case allows a unique, closed-form solution to the discussed problem.
No sophisticated reasoning is necessary in this case. See section 3.1.
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N > 0, so for all k > 0 and N > 0, there locally exists an implicit function a∗ such
that Φ(a∗(k;N), k;N) = 0.
To obtain uniqueness of a∗, we shall note that for each given configuration of
exogenous parameter values, and given a, k,N > 0, both partial derivatives of the
implicit function, ∂a
∂k
and ∂a
∂N
have a constant sign. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
we have ∂a
∂k
= − ∂Φ∂k∂Φ
∂a
and ∂a
∂N
= − ∂Φ∂N∂Φ
∂a
. Constancy of the sign of ∂Φ
∂a
we have already
proven above. ∂Φ
∂N
= −1 so it is obviously always negative. Since
∂Φ
∂k
=
(
βδθ
βδ − θ
)
cβδa
βδ(αδ−θ)
βδ−θ k
βδθ
βδ−θ−1,
we get ∂Φ
∂k
> 0 if and only if δ < 0, θ < 0 or δ > 0, θ > 0; and ∂Φ
∂k
< 0 if δ > 0
and θ < 0. Thus, signs of ∂a
∂k
and ∂a
∂N
never change. Uniqueness of a∗ follows from a
juxtaposition of this fact with global differentiability of Φ.
From (12), we have that if a positive a∗(k;N) exists and is unique, then automat-
ically so is b∗(k;N). 
A.3 Second-order conditions
To save on algebraic manipulations, we shall simplify the competitive firm’s optimiza-
tion problem (10). Solving it is a task equivalent to finding extreme values of the
following Lagrangian:
L(a, b, λ) = A˜θ[ψ(bK)θ + (1− ψ)(aL)θ]− λ(γaαδ + bβδ −N).
The Lagrangian L should be maximized (if θ > 0), or minimized (if θ < 0).
We have 
La(a, b, λ) = A˜(1− ψ)θaθ−1Lθ − λγαδaαδ−1 = 0,
Lb(a, b, λ) = A˜ψθbθ−1Lθ − λβδbβδ−1 = 0,
Lλ(a, b, λ) = γaαδ + bβδ −N = 0.
Moving the terms with λ in the first two equations to the RHS, and dividing sidewise
yields (11).
In the optimum, we also have λ = A˜
θ(1−ψ)θLθaθ−αδ
γαδ
= A˜
θψθKθbθ−βδ
γβδ
.
The second derivatives of the Lagrangian are (after inserting appropriate expres-
sions for λ): 
Laa(a, b) = A˜θ(1− ψ)θaθ−2Lθ(θ − αδ),
Lab(a, b) = Lba(a, b) = 0,
Lbb(a, b) = A˜θψθbθ−2Kθ(θ − βδ).
If Laa and Lbb are both negative, then we have a maximum; and if they are both
positive, we have a minimum. It is straightforward to see, that we need αδ > θ and
βδ > θ for our optimization criteria to be satisfied. 
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A.4 Factor-neutrality?
In this appendix, we shall confront the simple intuition that for given and fixed factor
endowments K and L, an exogenous change in N (which is driven by a decrease in
P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b)) is factor-neutral. Namely, we shall check whether a percentage
change in N modifies a∗ and b∗ – before the firm is allowed to choose their preferred
technology – proportionately. Contrary to this intuition, it turns out to be so only
in three specific cases: δ = 0 (the Jones’ case), θ = −∞ (where local production
functions are Leontief), and α = β (the CES case).
To prove this, we shall use (12) to obtain
εb ≡ ∂b
∂N
N
b
=
∂b
∂a
∂a
∂N
N
b
=
(
αδ − θ
βδ − θ
)
∂a
∂N
N
a
≡
(
αδ − θ
βδ − θ
)
εa, (38)
so εa = εb only if δ = 0, θ = −∞ or α = β, which is the result announced just above.
Moreover, in the generic case δ 6= 0, θ 6= −∞ and α 6= β, we obtain that for any
given K and L, |εa| > |εb| if and only if α < β. Intuitively, it means that “crude”
technical change (not corrected for firms’ technology choices yet) always favors the
direction, whose distribution tail is fatter, so the prospects for further progress are
greater.28
B A model of research
In this appendix, we shall present a model of research, which we had in mind when
stating Definition 1.
We assume a continuum of researchers, located along the unit interval I = [0, 1].
Each researcher i ∈ I draws one technology pair (ai, bi) from the joint idea distribution
(a˜, b˜). An application of the Law of Large Numbers implies that for all values of
a ≥ γa, b ≥ γb, there must exist some researcher who has drawn a technology pair
arbitrarily close to (a, b) in terms of the usual Pythagorean metric on R2.
Let us now define the dependence between individual draws of ideas and the
technology that becomes the output of the research process. We assume that a
technology pair (a, b) can be made available for production only after a given fraction
x ∈ (0, 1) of researchers understands it and helps incorporate it into the existing stock
of knowledge.29 To put it formally, a technology pair (a, b) becomes available only if
a given fraction x of researchers have drawn a technology pair that is not inferior to
(a, b).
The reader may now wonder what we mean by not inferior in a two-dimensional
setup. We explain this as follows. Let us consider a single ray from the origin: a
28We used absolute values of εa and εb, because these values are negative if δ < 0. In such case,
advancing to further and further technology frontiers, or decreasing P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b), is associated
with decreasing N .
29See Olsson (2005) for a detailed presentation of the foundations of this line of reasoning.
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semi-straight line {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : b = ωa}, where ω ∈ (0,+∞) is given. Along such
a ray, all points are indexed by a single number a ≥ γa. And on the real line, there
exists a natural ordering.
Using the Law of Large Numbers again, we obtain that there exists a unique
a¯ > γa such that for all γa < a < a¯, technology (a, ωa) is understood by at least x
per cent of researchers. The “frontier” technology (a¯, ωa¯) is characterized by P (a˜ >
a¯, b˜ > ωa¯) = x, and all technologies (a, ωa) for which P (a˜ > a, b˜ > ωa) > x are
inferior to the technology (a¯, ωa¯) because both their coordinates are lower. Thus, the
“frontier” technology pair (a¯, ωa¯) is the best one attainable within the given ray.
We carry this procedure out for all rays from the origin, letting the index ω go
from 0 to +∞. In the final outcome, we obtain that the best attainable (“frontier”)
technologies are located along the curve {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) = x}. We refer
to the x-th contour of the idea cumulative distribution function as to the technology
frontier.
Until now there has been no technological progress (and in fact, no time dimen-
sion) in this model of research. We introduce it by assuming that as time goes on,
researchers (whom we assume to be infinitely-lived for simplicity) gradually accumu-
late knowledge, and so it is easier and easier for them to understand and accomodate
further innovations. Hence, further and further technology frontiers become attain-
able in the passage of time. Again for simplicity, we do not model the knowledge
accumulation process explicitly. Instead, we proxy it with an exogenous decline in x
which yields equivalent results.
Employing our model of research helps simplify the original Jones’ framework
greatly. First, we do not have to use Fre´chet distributions or Poisson processes to
obtain our results. Second, we are able to achieve more generality, which would not
be possible if we insisted on maintaining full stochasticity until the end of analysis:
one can easily imagine that if the simplest case already involves Fre´chet distributions,
then more complex ones would simply be intractable.
C Shifts in the distribution of ideas
In the main text, we have identified technical progress with downward shifts in the
probability P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b). When doing so, we were holding all other model param-
eters constant. We shall now relax this assumption and examine the effect of ongoing
shifts in the distribution of ideas.
The problem may seem far-fetched at the first glance. Actually, it is the opposite
due to the existence of positive feedbacks in research activity: research consists not
only in discovering laws and concepts that are an inherent part of the universe, but
also in creating new possibilities for further research, new areas of knowledge that
could have a priori never appeared. Shifts in the idea distribution can be identified
with the creation of such new fields of research as well as with changes in the unit
efficiency of R&D itself.
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In our model, the joint distribution of ideas is characterized by the quintuple of
parameters (γa, γb, α, β, δ). To keep things as simple as possible, and still come to
face a few paradoxes, we shall look at the consequences of ongoing changes in γb (the
cutoff point of the Pareto capital-augmenting idea distribution) only, and keep all
other parameters constant. Moreover, we shall do it only in the three particular cases
of interest, namely the two Cobb-Douglas cases and the CES case.
In the Jones’ (2005) “independence” δ = 0 case, we have
g = Nˆ = αγˆa + βγˆb − xˆ,
where we have written x ≡ P (a˜ > a, b˜ > b) for brevity. Instead of assuming that
xˆ = −g, which we implicitly did in the main text, we could have taken some different
combination of growth rates of parameters, say γˆb =
g
β
and γˆa = xˆ = 0. In any case, if
γˆb > 0 in the long run, so that the marginal distribution of unit capital productivity
is continuously shifted to the right, then we immediately obtain a paradox: the firm
would not like to adopt any capital-augmenting improvements and yet it has to. Since
b ≥ γb > 0, we arrive at a corner solution with bˆ = γˆb > 0 from some time on. Thus,
the Jones’ result of purely labor-augmenting technical change ceases to hold in the
long run.
In the case of Cobb-Douglas LPFs (θ = 0), we have
g = Nˆ = βδγˆb + ̂(x−δ + 1),
and we want to assume γb > 0 again. For simplicity, we shall take xˆ = 0 and γˆb =
g
βδ
.
This implies γˆ = g, and so, bˆ = g
βδ
− 1
βδ
̂(γ + γψα
(1−ψ)β ) =
g
βδ
− g
βδ
= 0. Hence, we arrive
at the same paradox as above. For the firms, it would be optimal not to implement
any capital-augmenting inventions, but from some time on, they will be forced to do
so. The condition b ≥ γb > 0 will ultimately be binding. Purely labor-augmenting
technical change (brought about by the shifts in γb!) does not stand the test of
rightward-shifting capital-augmenting idea distribution.
We shall now turn to the CES case α = β. By taking ξ < 0, we shall assume
away the possibility of endogenous growth. Just like above, we shall let xˆ = 0 and
γˆb =
g
αδ
. Again, it implies γˆ = g. Apparently, we obtain a different paradox now: as
technological progress shifts γb only, and leaves all other model parameters (including
x) intact, the factor-neutral productivity level A approaches a constant. To show this,
we proceed in two steps. First, we observe that Aˆ→ Nˆ
αδ
− θ
αδ−θ
αδ−θ
αδθ
γˆ = g
αδ
− g
αδ
= 0.
Second, we use of slightly more tedious algebra to reveal that there indeed exists a
limit value of A. It equals A¯ ≡ A˜N
1
αδ
0 (1 − ψ)
1
θ , where N0 is the technology level N
at time 0. This means that in the long run, total per capita product and capital per
worker stabilize, and the economy never reaches the asymptotic BGP. From (35), and
using the fact that with time, the CES distribution parameter ζ approaches zero, we
obtain the steady-state value of capital per worker, k∗ = sA¯
δK+n
, and the steady-state
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level of product y∗ = sA¯. The growth rate of b∗ is not constant and is certainly
not zero; it approaches bˆ∗ → g
αδ
(
αδ−θ+αδθ
(αδ−θ)αδ
)
. The paradoxical result is that in the
CES case, under technical progress through shifts in γb, a steady-state economy and
continued improvements in unit capital productivity go together.
If 0 > θ ≥ αδ−(αδ)2
1−2αδ , i.e. if θ is close enough to zero, then bˆ
∗ is smaller than growth
rate of γb. If θ is greater than this threshold value, however, we ultimately get a
corner solution with γˆb = bˆ =
g
αδ
. This is the same paradox as in the Cobb-Douglas
cases discussed above.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. (2003), “Labor- and Capital-Augmenting Technical Change”, Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association I, 1-37.
[2] Arrow, K.J., H.B. Chenery, B.S. Minhas, and R.M. Solow (1961), “Capital-Labor
Substitution and Economic Efficiency”, Review of Economics and Statistics 43,
225-250.
[3] Atkinson, A.B., J.E. Stiglitz (1969), “A New View of Technological Change”,
Economic Journal 79, 573-578.
[4] Basu, S., D.N. Weil (1998), “Appropriate Technology and Growth”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113, 1025-1054.
[5] Caselli, F., W.J. Coleman, “The World Technology Frontier”, forthcoming in
American Economic Review.
[6] de La Grandville, O. (1989), “In the Quest of the Slutsky Diamond”, American
Economic Review 79(3), 468-481.
[7] Gabaix, X. (1999), “Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114, 739-767.
[8] Houthakker, H.S. (1955-56), “The Pareto Distribution and the Cobb-Douglas Pro-
duction Function in Activity Analysis”, Review of Economic Studies 23, 27-31.
[9] Jones, C.I. (2005), “The Shape of Production Functions and the Direction of
Technical Change”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), 517-549.
[10] Jones, L.E., R.E. Manuelli (1990), “A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth:
Theory and Policy Implications”, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1008-1038.
[11] Klump, R., O. de La Grandville (2000), “Economic Growth and the Elasticity of
Substitution: Two Theorems and Some Suggestions”, American Economic Review
90, 282-291.
30
[12] Kortum, S.S. (1997), “Research, Patenting, and Technological Change”, Econo-
metrica 65, 1389-1419.
[13] Lotka, A.J. (1926), “The Frequency Distribution of Scientific Productivity”,
Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences XVI, 317-323.
[14] Nelsen, R.B., An Introduction to Copulas, Springer, New York 1999.
[15] Olsson, O. (2005), “Technological Opportunity and Growth”, Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth 10, 35-57.
[16] Palivos, T., G. Karagiannis (2004), “The Elasticity of Substitution in Convex
Models of Endogenous Growth”, University of Macedonia at Thessaloniki, mimeo.
[17] Revankar, N.S. (1971), “A Class of Variable Elasticity of Substitution Production
Functions”, Econometrica 39(1), 61-71.
[18] Sattinger, M. (1975), “Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings
and Abilities”, Econometrica 43(3), 455-468.
[19] Solow, R.M. (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 70, 65-94.
[20] Solow, R.M. (1960), “Investment and Technological Progress”, [in:] K. Arrow,
S. Karlin and P. Suppes (eds.), Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences 1959,
89-104. Stanford University Press.
[21] Solow, R.M., J. Tobin, C. von Weizsa¨cker, M. Yaari (1966), “Neoclassical Growth
With Fixed Factor Proportions”, Review of Economic Studies 33, 79-115.
[22] Uzawa, H. (1961), “Neutral Inventions and the Stability of Growth Equilibrium”,
Review of Economic Studies 28(2), 117-124.
[23] Yuhn, K.-H. (1991), “Economic Growth, Technical Change Biases, and the Elas-
ticity of Substitution: A Test of the de La Grandville Hypothesis”, Review of
Economics and Statistics 73(2), 340-346.
31
